An action is agentially perfect if and only if, if a person tries to perform it, they succeed, and, if a person performs it, they try to. We argue that trying itself is agentially perfect: if a person tries to try to do something, they try to do it; and, if a person tries to do something, they try to try to do it. We show how this claim sheds new light on the logical structure of intentional action, on the (...) question of whether basic actions are tryings, and on the notion of “options” in decision theory. On the way to these central ideas, we argue that a person can try to do something even if they believe it is impossible that they will succeed, that a person can try to do something even if they do not want to succeed, and that a person can try to do something even if they do not intend to succeed. (shrink)

This paper considers some puzzling knowledge ascriptions and argues that they present prima facie counterexamples to credence, belief, and justification conditions on knowledge, as well as to many of the standard meta-semantic assumptions about the context-sensitivity of ‘know’. It argues that these ascriptions provide new evidence in favor of contextualist theories of knowledge—in particular those that take the interpretation of ‘know’ to be sensitive to the mechanisms of constraint.

Counterfactuals are context-sensitive. However, we argue that various debates and doctrines in metaphysics and the philosophy of science are premised on ignoring the full extent of counterfactual context-sensitivity. Our focus is on the prominent "miracle" versus "no-miracle" debate about counterfactuals under the assumption that our laws of nature are deterministic. But we also discuss doctrines that employ counterfactuals in theories of rational decision, as well as doctrines that explain what it is to be a law of nature in terms of (...) counterfactuals. We conclude by drawing some morals about the use of counterfactuals in philosophical theorizing more generally. (shrink)

Dorian Gray pays a hefty price for years of sin and vice in this completely unabridged edition of The Picture of Dorian Gray.

This paper defends the view, put roughly, that to think that p is to guess that p is the answer to the question at hand, and that to think that p rationally is for one’s guess to that question to be in a certain sense non-arbitrary. Some theses that will be argued for along the way include: that thinking is question-sensitive and, correspondingly, that ‘thinks’ is context-sensitive; that it can be rational to think that p while having arbitrarily low credence (...) that p; that, nonetheless, rational thinking is closed under entailment; that thinking does not supervene on credence; and that in many cases what one thinks on certain matters is, in a very literal sense, a choice. Finally, since there are strong reasons to believe that thinking just is believing, there are strong reasons to think that all this goes for belief as well. (shrink)

How is what we believe related to how we act? That depends on what we mean by ‘believe’. On the one hand, there is what we're sure of: what our names are, where we were born, whether we are sitting in front of a screen. Surety, in this sense, is not uncommon — it does not imply Cartesian absolute certainty, from which no possible course of experience could dislodge us. But there are many things that we think that we are (...) not sure of. For example, you might think that it will rain sometime this month, but not be sure that it will. Both what we're sure of and what we think have important normative connections to action. But the connections are quite different. This paper explores these issues with respect to assertion, inquiry, and decision making. We conclude by arguing that there is no theoretically significant notion of ‘full belief’ intermediate in strength between thinking and being sure. (shrink)

I argue that a standard formulation of hinge epistemology is host to epistemic relativism and show that two leading hinge approaches (Coliva’s acceptance account and Pritchard’s nondoxastic account) are vulnerable to a form of incommensurability that leads to relativism. Building on both accounts, I introduce a new, minimally epistemic conception of hinges that avoids epistemic relativism and rationally resolves hinge disagreements. According to my proposed account, putative cases of epistemic incommensurability are rationally resolvable: hinges are propositions that are the objects (...) of our belief-like attitudes and are rationally revisable in virtue of our overarching commitment to avoid systematic deception in our epistemic practices. (shrink)

This paper presents a puzzle involving embedded attitude reports. We resolve the puzzle by arguing that attitude verbs take restricted readings: in some environments the denotation of attitude verbs can be restricted by a given proposition. For example, when these verbs are embedded in the consequent of a conditional, they can be restricted by the proposition expressed by the conditional’s antecedent. We formulate and motivate two conditions on the availability of verb restrictions: a constraint that ties the content of restrictions (...) to the “dynamic effects” of sentential connectives and a constraint that limits the availability of restriction effects to present tense verbs with first-person subjects. However, we also present some cases that make trouble for these conditions, and outline some possible ways of modifying the view to account for the recalcitrant data. We conclude with a brief discussion of some of the connections between our semantics for attitude verbs and issues concerning epistemic modals and theories of knowledge. (shrink)

This paper defends a theory of fictional truth. According to this theory, there is a fact of the matter concerning the number of hairs on Sherlock Holmes' head, and likewise for any other meaningful question one could ask about what's true in a work of fiction. We argue that a theory of this form is needed to account for the patterns in our judgments about attitude reports that embed fictional claims. We contrast our view with one of the dominant approaches (...) to fictional truth, which originates with David Lewis. Along the way we explore the relationship between fiction, counterfactuals, and vagueness. (shrink)

Considering the case of Juan de Vilanova y Piera, often celebrated as the first scientist to accept the prehistoric antiquity of palaeolithic paintings, we explore some of the problems related to the concept of ‘precursor’ in the field of the history of science. In the first section, we propose a brief history of this notion focusing on those authors who have reflected critically on the meaning of predecessors. In the second section, the example of Vilanova illustrates the ways in which (...) historians of science have created precursors. From the vantage of modern science, precursors have traditionally been defined as those who first indicated or announced ideas or theories later accepted by the scientific community. As a result, they have been represented as ‘heroes’ struggling hard to defeat the ignorance of their time. As the case of Juan de Vilanova illustrates, this traditional view is unsatisfactory in many ways. For this reason we consider in the third section a number of methodological strategies to promote a more adequate approach to pioneers. In particular, we suggest that the best way to surmount hagiographical approaches to past scientists is to put them in their own intellectual and historical contexts. (shrink)

Esta reflexión pretende visualizar algunos elementos y características de lo que se ha nombrado actualmente como el agotamiento de la racionalidad constitutiva de lo que fue conocido como “el proyecto político de la modernidad”. Para el caso latinoamericano, la institucionalidad política, acuñada al sistema democrático de occidente, en lugar de ser solución termina agudizando el contexto de dominación e injusticia. Al presente, “las repúblicas democráticas”, en la región latinoamericana, no han sido los espacios esperados de trámite de las contradicciones del (...) propio sistema. El siguiente argumento, en perspectiva crítica, intenta aportar al actual debate político nombrando algunos desafíos para las teorías políticas que buscan superar el pensamiento único, hoy reducido al economicismo hegemónico que hace ilegítimo el estado, en la búsqueda de otros proyectos de sociedad para el siglo XXI. (shrink)

This paper defends the simple view that in asserting that p, one lies iff one knows that p is false. Along the way it draws some morals about deception, knowledge, Gettier cases, belief, assertion, and the relationship between first- and higher-order norms.

I argue against the Standard View of ignorance, according to which ignorance is defined as equivalent to lack of knowledge, that cases of environmental epistemic luck, though entailing lack of knowledge, do not necessarily entail ignorance. In support of my argument, I contend that in cases of environmental luck an agent retains what I call epistemic access to the relevant fact by successfully exercising her epistemic agency and that ignorance and non-ignorance, contrary to what the Standard View predicts, are not (...) modal in the sense that knowledge is. After responding to objections, I conclude by sketching an alternative account of ignorance centered on the notions of epistemic access and epistemic agency. (shrink)

RESUMEN Desde el planteamiento de Gadamer sobre diálogo se muestra que cuando los interlocutores efectúan la conversación en armonía con el proteger el derecho de opinión y el reconocer de modo recíproco los límites de los puntos de vista arriesgados, es factible configurar comunidad de vida humana en la mutua estima y aprobar la validez de otros juicios como respuestas que ayudan con el proceso interhumano de entendimiento común. Y en este realizar el diálogo así tiene lugar una creación nueva (...) de sentido que con la participación de la pluralidad lleva a cabo simultáneamente la actualización del habitual modo de efectuar la formación de comunidad de vida. En la medida en que los interlocutores ejercen el entender sus opiniones en relación con la pregunta orientadora del diálogo y reconocen la finitud de sus puntos de vista como posibilidades entre otras, se contribuye con el establecimiento de comunidad de vida humana en un sentido completamente distinto trasformando con ello de un modo u otro las prácticas habituales de relación e integración social. En primer lugar, se explica el vínculo entre experiencia comprensible y conversación; y, en segundo lugar, se establece el modo como Gadamer describe el presupuesto hermenéutico de la pertenencia y su relación con la creación de un nuevo sentido que incumbe a la experiencia comprensible del entendimiento interhumano en la conversación. ABSTRACT From Gadamer's approach to dialogue, it is shown that when the interlocutors carry out the conversation in harmony with protecting the right of opinion and reciprocally recognizing the limits of risky points of view, it is feasible to configure a community of human life in mutual estimate and approve the validity of other judgments as answers that help with the interhuman process of common understanding. And in this realization of the dialogue thus a new creation of meaning takes place that with the participation of the plurality simultaneously carries out the updating of the usual way of carrying out the formation of a community of life. To the extent that the interlocutors understand their opinions in relation to the guiding question of the dialogue and recognize the finiteness of their points of view as possibilities among others, it contributes to the establishment of a community of human life in a completely different sense, transforming with this, in one way or another, the usual practices of relationship and social integration. First, the link between understandable experience and conversation is explained; and, secondly, the way in which Gadamer describes the hermeneutical assumption of belonging and its relationship with the creation of a new meaning that concerns the comprehensible experience of interhuman understanding in conversation is established. (shrink)

A plausible principle about the felicitous use of indicative conditionals says that there is something strange about asserting an indicative conditional when you know whether its antecedent is true. But in most contexts there is nothing strange at all about asserting indicative conditionals like ‘If Oswald didn’t shoot Kennedy, then someone else did’. This paper argues that the only compelling explanation of these facts requires the resources of contextualism about knowledge.

This paper argues that two widely accepted principles about the indicative conditional jointly presuppose the falsity of one of the most prominent arguments against epistemological iteration principles. The first principle about the indicative conditional, which has close ties both to the Ramsey test and the “or‐to‐if” inference, says that knowing a material conditional suffices for knowing the corresponding indicative. The second principle says that conditional contradictions cannot be true when their antecedents are epistemically possible. Taken together, these principles entail that (...) it is impossible to be in a certain kind of epistemic state: namely, a state of ignorance about which of two partially overlapping bodies of knowledge corresponds to one's actual one. However, some of the more popular “margin for error” style arguments against epistemological iteration principles suggest that such states are not only possible, but commonplace. I argue that the tension between these views runs deep, arising just as much for non‐factive attitudes like belief, presupposition, and certainty. I also argue that this is worse news for those who accept the principles about the indicative conditional than it is for those who reject epistemological iteration principles. (shrink)

Although much has been written about the truth-conditions of de re attitude reports, little attention has been paid to certain ‘ultra-liberal’ uses of those reports. We believe that if these uses are legitimate, then a number of interesting consequences for various theses in philosophical semantics follow. The majority of the paper involves describing these consequences. In short, we argue that, if true, ultra-liberal reports: bring counterexamples to a popular approach to de re attitude ascriptions, which we will call ‘descriptivism’; and (...) combine with independently plausible principles about the logic of belief to imply that subjects can achieve omniscience about what exists from the armchair. Although we are not committed to the view that ultra-liberal reports are false, in the final part of the paper we discuss the prospects of pursuing a line according to which the acceptability of such reports ought not be taken at face value. We conclude by arguing that those who are sympathetic with this move might have reason to doubt the truth of an even broader class of acceptable de re attitude reports, namely those that have been taken to undermine orthodox accounts of de re attitude ascriptions. (shrink)

La ontología de la erraticidad de Luis Sáez Rueda es el punto de partida de la reflexión netamente hispanoamericana que propone esta obra. El libro no pretende, sin embargo, homenajear o celebrar a un pensador, sino dar un paso iniciático en orden a gestar un pensamiento común, pero al mismo tiempo diferencial, a partir de la ineludible erraticidad que caracteriza la estancia del ser humano en el mundo. La condición errática del hombre, la irresoluble tensión entre, por un lado, la (...) gravitación céntrica por la que todos nosotros radicamos en un mundo concreto en el que encontramos abrigo y protección, y el extrañamiento excéntrico, por otro, que impulsa a trascender los límites de esa y cualquier otra radicación, articula un entramado filosófico en el que la nostalgia y el retorno al origen no pueden orientar un proyecto vital deseable. (shrink)

In attempting to debunk moral realism through an appeal to evolutionary facts, debunkers face a series of problems, which we label the problems of scope, corrosiveness, and post‐hoc justification. To overcome these problems, debunkers must assume certain metaphysical or epistemological positions, or otherwise pre‐establish them. In doing so, they must assume or pre‐establish the very conclusion they seek in advancing the argument. This means that such debunking arguments either beg the question against the moral realist or are undermined as standalone (...) metaethical arguments. (shrink)

This book presents an original thesis about the notion of sensory experience and of the mind’s architecture, which is grounded in current trends in cognitive science and philosophy of mind. Presented in the form of a dialogue, the book explores some of the psychological and philosophical consequences that the author derives from his proposal.

An individual's health, genetic, or environmental-exposure data, placed in an online repository, creates a valuable shared resource that can accelerate biomedical research and even open opportunities for crowd-sourcing discoveries by members of the public. But these data become “immortalized” in ways that may create lasting risk as well as benefit. Once shared on the Internet, the data are difficult or impossible to redact, and identities may be revealed by a process called data linkage, in which online data sets are matched (...) to each other. Reidentification, the process of associating an individual's name with data that were considered deidentified, poses risks such as insurance or employment discrimination, social stigma, and breach of the promises often made in informed-consent documents. At the same time, re-ID poses risks to researchers and indeed to the future of science, should re-ID end up undermining the trust and participation of potential research participants. The ethical challenges of online data sharing are heightened as so-called big data becomes an increasingly important research tool and driver of new research structures. Big data is shifting research to include large numbers of researchers and institutions as well as large numbers of participants providing diverse types of data, so the participants’ consent relationship is no longer with a person or even a research institution. In addition, consent is further transformed because big data analysis often begins with descriptive inquiry and generation of a hypothesis, and the research questions cannot be clearly defined at the outset and may be unforeseeable over the long term. In this article, we consider how expanded data sharing poses new challenges, illustrated by genomics and the transition to new models of consent. We draw on the experiences of participants in an open data platform—the Personal Genome Project—to allow study participants to contribute their voices to inform ethical consent practices and protocol reviews for big-data research. (shrink)

Insofar as development implies economic growth, the term 'sustainable development' appears to some as a contradiction in terms. However, such conclusions still lack a thorough examination of the conceptual structure of the two terms between which there is a purported contradiction. In order to address this issue, the present paper scrutinises some of the assumptions which underwrite the ideologies of sustainability and of development. It is argued that there are key assumptions which both ideas have in common, and that sustainable (...) development is thus perfectly coherent on a conceptual level. It is alternatives which retain either term (such as 'sustainable degrowth') that are embroiled in paradox. The paper then examines two concepts for criticising the ideology of economic growth in other terms: dépense and conviviality. It is argued that the latter is preferable to the former for the purpose of developing post-sustainable critiques of growth. (shrink)

Reconstruction is a central notion in Dewey’s account of inquiry and in his metaphilosophical commitments. In his work, Dewey made a call for reconstruction of philosophy, in the reconstruction of central notions of the discipline, like knowledge, logic, truth, the good, reason, and experience. Inquiry itself is reconstructive, according to Dewey, involving the transformation of an indeterminate situation into one which is determinate and understood. Dewey’s philosophical views should therefore be of interest to those taking part in the recent turn (...) towards revisionary philosophical methodologies, like conceptual engineering, explication, and amelioration. In light of the recent developments in revisionary methodologies, I aim to explore Dewey’s conception of concepts in relation to the conceptual engineering literature, suggesting that it provides a useful conception of concepts for conceptual engineering, and to suggest a Deweyan model of philosophical inquiry where concepts are the objects of inquiry. In both cases, I hope to show a productive interaction between Dewey’s ideas and contemporary discussions of conceptual engineering. (shrink)

O princípio de intersubstituição dos idênticos salva veritate, que constitui uma peça de importância central para a teoria leibniziana da demostração, para não falar de suas implicações ontológicas, recebeu a crítica de que encerra uma confusão entre uso e menção. Em contraste com essa crítica, o presente trabalho defende a tese de que o princípio não está suscetível a essa pretensa confusão, utilizando, para tanto, a distinção leibniziana entre “a consideração do modo de conceber” e a “consideração da coisa mesma”. (...) A introdução dessa distinção, porém, vem acompanhada com a necessidade de estabelecer restrições à aplicação do mencionado princípio. (shrink)

Carta sobre el platonismo, enviada por G.W. Leibniz a M.G. Hansch el 25 de julio de 1707.

This paper argues that there are instances in which tobacco control litigation is strengthening the justiciability of the right to health and health-related rights. This is happening in different parts of the world, but in particular in Latin America. In part this is because, to a certain extent, tobacco control litigation based on fundamental rights overcomes the traditional arguments against economic, social and cultural rights adjudication: the anti-democratic argument, the lack of technical competency argument, the problem of the misallocation of (...) scarce public resources and the problem of the implementation of judicial decisions. As we analyzed in this paper, tobacco control cases based on fundamental rights are allowing courts to elaborate on broader standards of judicial adjudication of social rights, e.g., expand notions of standing, progressive realization, and state obligations enshrined in the right to health. Key to this judicial trend is the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, which provides a legal standard — supported by scientific evidence — defining concrete measures states should take to address the tobacco epidemic, and thus giving content to the right to health as it relates to tobacco control. (shrink)

There is perhaps no area of law that so effectively protects human health and thereby advances the right to the highest attainable standard of health, as tobacco control. Globally, tobacco is responsible for 1 in 10 adult deaths, and is on track to kill 10 million people per year, mostly in developing countries, representing a US$200 billion drain on the global economy. Yet experience in recent decades has shown that a range of tobacco control measures, such as comprehensive bans on (...) smoking in public places, tobacco taxes, and limits on tobacco advertising, can greatly reduce smoking prevalence. These measures have slowly curtailed the epidemic, despite strong opposition from various sectors led by the tobacco industry. It is fitting that tobacco control is the focus of a recent, widely ratified global treaty and of increasing national litigation, often directly linked to countries’ human rights commitments. (shrink)

This paper discusses the meaning of an image rarely used within the religious and philosophical corpus of ancient India in order to describe the ultimate nature of God and the human being: a wall or canvas (Sanskrit, bhitti). The usage of such a peculiar image belongs to Abhinavagupta, the great exegete of the Tantric tradition who lived in Kashmir between the tenth and eleventh centuries A.D. After presenting some antecedents, the paper focuses on key passages taken fromAbhinavagupta’s work and shows (...) how, far from being secondary, the image of a wall possesses a remarkable consistency and expressive power in accordance withAbhinavagupta’s doctrinal presuppositions, in particular his commitment to a dynamic and ultimately paradoxical view of the divine realm, the universe and salvation. (shrink)

Philosophical intervention in the dialogue between science and theology: an analysis of the concept of consonance In the last decades, a strong debate on the relationship between science and theology has taken place. In the early 1980, Ernan McMullin introduced the notion of “consonance”, defined as the spontaneous convergence of the conclusions presented by the natural sciences and theology on certain features or properties of the universe. In this paper, I shall try, first and foremost, to carefully look into the (...) meaning that has been attributed to this relationship. Thus, I shall examine the possible implications derived from specific cases of consonance; I shall consider the connection between consonance and truth ; I shall expand on the proposal for a dialogue based on different attitudes regarding consonance ; I shall evaluate the thesis that understands consonance as a cultural construction or an a priori accepted in certain contexts; finally, I shall mention certain variations of this concept, such as strong and weak consonance, or hypothetical consonance. Then, I shall explain the assumptions on which the idea of consonance rests: the unity and intelligibility of reality, the diversity of formal objects and the realism of knowledge. All these assumptions are comprehensive proof of the indispensable intervention of philosophy, as wisdom, in any kind of exchange that occurs between science and theology. And it is only from them that criticism regarding this issue is vested authority. Finally, I suggest a series of critical proposals on the notion of consonance. I shall stress, on the positive side, the opportunity that it offers to move towards a greater disciplinary integration and foster, at the same time, the ordering mission of philosophical wisdom. On the negative side, I shall point out the confusion between religion and theology, the tendency towards a kind of epistemic naturalism of theology, the uncertain creation of the idea of scientific realism and the aspiration to an excessive interference among disciplines. (shrink)

Cabrera Rodríguez, José Antonio. “El trasfondo psicologista en la teoría schopenhaueriana de la percepción.” Estudios de Filosofía 52 (2015): 95-110.

Se aborda de forma crítica la exposición del desorden del espectro autista llevada a cabo en la quinta y última edición del Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5), herramienta principal de muchos psiquiatras para comprender y diagnosticar cualquier psicopatología. Con este abordaje se busca evidenciar cómo, en el DSM-5 –al igual que en la interpretación inaugurada por Baron-Cohen, Leslie y Frith–, se deja de lado la experiencia y el cuerpo animado del paciente, por lo que es aconsejable un (...) nuevo acercamiento a dicho desorden que tenga fundamentos fenomenológicos. Finalmente, se presenta el bosquejo de una fenomenología del desorden del espectro autista que reconoce la primacía del cuerpo animado en la experiencia del mundo, de sí mismo y de los otros. (shrink)